

Additional Readings for Modal Logic Seminar

1. *Existence*

Plato *Sophist 237b-239c* in Cornford (1959); Richard Cartwright (1987) “Negative Existentials”; Bertrand Russell (1905) “On Denoting”; W. V. O. Quine (1961), “On What There Is”; Rudolf Carnap: “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology” in Linsky (1952)

2. *Identity*

Gottlob Frege (1892), “On Sense and Reference”; Peter Geach (1972), “Identity”; Alston & Bennett (1984), “Identity and Cardinality”; John Perry (1970), “The Same F”; Peter Strawson (1959), *Individuals*, Part One; Bertrand Russell, “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description” in Salmon & Soames (1988) ; M. Black, A. J. Ayer, D. J. O’Conner, “The Identity of Indiscernibles” in Loux (1970)

3. *Propositional Attitudes* G. Frege (1891), “On Function and Concept”; David Kaplan (1969), “Quantifying In”; Donald Davidson (1968), “On Saying That”; T. McKay & Nelson (Winter 2006), “Propositional Attitude Reports”

4. *Possible World Semantics, I*

W. V. O. Quine (1953), “Three Grades of Modal Involvement”; W. V. O. Quine (1961), “Reference and Modality”; W. V. O. Quine, “Modality and Description” in Linsky (1971); Richard Mendelsohn (2005), *The Philosophy of Gottlob Frege* Ch 5; David Lewis (1983), “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic”; A Smullyan (1948), “Modality and Description”, Frege (1891), “On Function and Concept”

5. *Mereology*

W. V. O. Quine (1961), “Identity, Ostension and Hypostasis”; Nelson Goodman (1951), Ch. 2; Michael Loux (2001), “Enduration and Perduration”; D. Lewis (1986), *On the Plurality of Worlds*

6. *Possible World Semantics, II*

Saul Kripke (1980), *Naming and Necessity*; Rudolf Carnap (1947), *Meaning and Necessity*; David Kaplan (1989), “Demonstratives”; Kripke (1977), “Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference”; Kripke (1979), “A Puzzle About Belief”

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- Goodman, N. (1951), *The Structure of Appearance*, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis.
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